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Abstract: 
As China‘s largest and wealthiest city, Shanghai‘s dynamic growth since the 1990s indicates the spatial form of 
new metropolitan expansion patterns. This research deals with mechanisms shaping emerging 
patterns, including the rise of a land market, settlement of inner suburbs by urban core and ―floating‖ 
populations, and peri-urban in-filling. Growth drivers flow from planning and targeting high technology 
manufacturing based on domestic research and development, foreign companies, and joint ventures as well as 
new sources of domestic capital based on property development schemes and cooperation between Party cadres 
and local entrepreneurs. Evidence comes from the 2000 Census, remotely sensed photography, and interviews 
with city planners. The match between new residential and occupational spaces and transportation infrastructure 
connections for a more mobile and spatially diffuse population is of concern for future policy.  
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Article: 
Introduction 
This research seeks to examine the emerging spatial patterns of China‘s most rapidly developing market-driven 
metropolis. A broad goal is to see whether the evolution of Shanghai‘s urban economy is increasingly similar to 
that in more developed countries and is leading to urban growth patterns that also increasingly resemble those 
of other global cities such as New York and Tokyo. New processes of cooperation between elite Party cadres 
and local entrepreneurs have provided new sources of capital for investing in infrastructure and property 
development for commercial, industrial, and residential projects. These new processes are replacing the 
traditional state-directed central planning and financed forms of urban development. 
 
By sheer numbers, Shanghai commands attention for its size, economic productivity, and attraction of foreign 
investment (Table 1). The reach of its markets along transportation corridors also reveals Shanghai‘s economic 
power. The region within a ―1-day drive‖ constitutes the largest in East Asia-twice Tokyo‘s population, triple 
Manila‘s size, and quadruple Bangkok‘s bulk. World Bank figures predict that by 2005, the Yangzi Delta 
megalopolis, with Shanghai as its core metropolis, will hold a population of 75 million, of which 52% will 
reside in urban areas. Linked by the National Trunk Highway System, Shanghai‘s 2-day market will supply 
60% of China‘s GDP, constituting the undisputed core of the nation‘s economy (Leman, 2002). 
 
Shanghai is China‘s largest and greatest commercial and industrial city. With 0.1 % of the land area of the 
country, it supplies over 12% of the municipal revenue and handles more than a quarter of total trade passing 
through China‘s ports. Its year 2000 population, according to China‘s latest census, was 16.74 million and 
represented an increase of 3.4 million from the 1990 size with an average annual growth rate through the decade 
of the 1990s of 2.2% and a total increase of 25.5% (Population Census Office, 2001). The average size of a 
family in Shanghai had declined to less that 3 people during the last decade, and it is clear that most of 
Shanghai‘s population growth is driven by migration rather than natural factors based on high birth and fertility 
rates. Shanghai has for many years had the lowest birth rate in China, a rate lower than large American cities 
such as New York. 
As with most cities in China, Shanghai is overbounded in its administrative territory. The city in the year 2000 
was comprised of 17 urban districts and three counties together occupying 6300 km
2
 of land area. The three 
counties contain substantial rural land and a number of rural residents who continue to farm for their livelihood. 
The city has the highest population density of all the first order administrative units in China, with 2657 people 
per km
2
 in 2000. Owing to its continued growth and industrial and commercial development, Shanghai also has 
the highest index of urbanization among all of China‘s first order administrative units, with 88.3% of the 
official population (14.78 million) classified as urban (Population Census Office, 2001). 
 
The search for a theoretical framework to encompass this statistical outline forms a common theme in articles 
on urban China. The following section suggests the utility of two models in particular whose application to 
cities such as Shanghai might be usefully tested: the corporatist model, and urban growth regime. Both include 
the power of a central political player as a key factor, in alliance with other locally organized power centers. 
Typical of the situation in developing countries (rather than developed political economies which were the 
original theoretical models), these partners in power can be local bureaucrats and governments, their state 
owned enterprises, native entrepreneurs, foreign joint ventures or direct investments working through Chinese 
intermediaries. 
 
Theoretical constructs: urban growth dynamics 
Attempts to formulate grand conceptual designs to account for global economic change must necessarily 
encompass the phenomena of China‘s dynamic economic shifts and growth since 1978 (Yeung and Lin, 2003). 
Since the experience of rapid Asian growth occurred after that of more developed countries, theorists first look 
to pre-existing models for any notions that might be adaptable to Asia‘s situation. Urban regime theory has 
served as the dominant interpretive framework for explicating development in western cities for over a decade. 
Clarence Stone‘s (1989) profile of Atlanta as an archetypal city operating in this mode of political-economic 
urban restructuring poses the question as to what extent regime theory applies to transitioning socialist cities. 
Certainly an interpretation of the goal of urban growth regimes as economically motivated actions leavened 
with social concerns and applied to analyzing the relationship between economic restructuring, urban 
redevelopment policies, and political actions logically can be linked to a transitioning Leninist society (Davies, 
2002). A useful review of this conceptual framework that also includes a discussion of the ―corporatist model‖ 
can be found in Knox‘s (1994) textbook on urbanization. In this model, government power constitutes a key 
part of a ―symbiotic relationship‖ (Knox, 1994, p. 370) with other private organizations whose representatives 
participate in the decision-making process. Politically empowered technocrats dominate and guide the process 
and its conclusion. 
 
Several studies have attempted to link explicitly the American-based urban regime framework to China‘s 
experience, including Stoker and Mossberger‘s (1994) tripartite typology that identified ―instrumental regimes‖ 
with Atlanta, and ―symbolic regimes‖ with the situation in Chinese cities. As used by Stoker and Mossberger, 
the partnership is symbolic in that the senior partner of the State (or Party) retains by far the most—or 
ultimate—control. The key characteristic of an urban growth regime consists of a coalition of governmental and 
non-governmental actors necessary to construct an effective alliance for action. The symbolic regime‘s 
distinction is that it seeks changes via a non-local dependency and utilizes the Party apparatus rather than 
elected officials as in the United States. Wu (1999) notes that the transitioning nature of China‘s economy 
heightens the importance of coalitions of bureaucratic-government actors and capital-supplying non-govern-
ment business connections in an unblended system of capitalist elements grafted on to a lingering political 
structure. 
In the new urban growth regime of politics and economics ―with Chinese characteristics,‖ economic forces 
drive development under loosened central planning. Entrepreneuralism encourages the formation of public-
private partnerships for projects, but the Party maintains final approval power. Thus, as in the west, individual 
actors in an ultimately hierarchical system exercise an elite control, while sharing the goal of urban economic 
development. An excellent study of the manner in which local party elites affect the trajectory of urban 
development may be reviewed in Wank‘s (1999) ethnographic study of Xiamen, one of China‘s early special 
economic zones. Wank provides probing insight into how state agents and local entrepreneurs interact to create 
patron–client relations for profit and enduring mutual success. Finally, Ma (2002) has reviewed how party elites 
at varying hierarchical levels and spatial scales operate to assist local change and the impact this has had on 
China‘s urban transition. As he noted, this participation and effect on elites is far-reaching and profound in both 
urban and rural areas. Shanghai provides an excellent example and model to examine and document recent 
rapid urban growth and change in China‘s transitioning economy. 
 
Spatial patterns 
Land use changes since the early 1990s, reflected in population density changes (Fig. 1), demonstrate a spread 
outward from the urban edges, and the growth of satellite cities—what in developed countries is disdainfully 
referred to as sprawl. As in many rapidly growing North American cities, the fastest and most extensive growth 
occurred on the outer edges of both metropolitan Shanghai and the inner suburban ring. Similar to the US in the 
1960–1970s, most of the population loss occurred in the inner urban core, but for quite different reasons as 
discussed in the following section. These development patterns ―with Chinese characteristics‖ reflect the hand 
of the government planner partners in Shanghai‘s ―symbolic growth coalition‖. Responding not only to the new 
commodification of land which made agricultural areas available for higher economic utilization, these high 
growth subdistricts mirror government policy of dispersing population from overly crowded cores to new areas 
of employment and transportation linkages. The square outlines revealed most clearly in the year 2000 image 
reflect the planned and imposed nature of development. 
 
Contrast with the 1993 picture also emphasizes growth of satellite cities in larger clusters around the periphery. 
Consolidation of earlier settlement areas serves as the launching region for extending population spread 
outward. Western phenomena such as ―leapfrogging‖ and ―scatteration‖ (Fujii & Hartshorn, 1995) do not 
appear to have occurred in the more regulated case of Shanghai‘s urban growth pattern, resulting in a more 
rational land utilization pattern. 
 
In an attempt to head off acquisitions of motorbikes and private cars, remedies are in the works for roads 
overcrowded with bicycles and highly unpredictable bus schedules due to congested traffic. Over the next 
several decades, a combination of subway and elevated light rail lines are planned to result in 21 metropolitan 
mass transportation connections. Five bridges and seven tunnels are also planned to connect Pudong with Puxi 
(American Chamber of Commerce, 2001). Asia‘s first operational magnetic levitation rail line now connects the 
new international airport in Pudong to the high tech park in Zhangjiang, a fairly short distance for such speed. 
Another line linking the political capital of Beijing with the economic center of Shanghai will soon go out for 
global bidding. Investment in transportation infrastructure by the national and municipal government was 
carefully timed to coincide with national scale land marketization and the demise of large, inefficient state 
owned enterprises that previously provided worker housing. Now citizens could purchase apartments newly 
constructed in the vicinity of new transportation corridors. Other population segments were relocated from 
extremely dense inner urban areas to peri-urban locations between the suburbs and urban Shanghai boundaries. 
 
The selection of Pudong, a formerly agricultural site and industrial slum on the eastern side of the Huangpu 
River, as the most modern and newest section of Shanghai with urban functions designed to be world class, 
pushed the city to its furthest boundary with the Pacific (Olds, 2001). It also linked Pudong to the financial 
world across the Pacific by enticing foreign capital through its shipping facilities, manufacturing zones, amenity 
environments, international airport, and deep water port with duty-free warehousing in Waigaochiao district 
(She et al, 1997). 
 
 
Spatial dynamics 
Economic independence and technology prioritization. Decisions to allow Shanghai to retain more of its taxes 
and invest them in that city‘s modernization in the late 1980s launched the current meteoric but sometimes 
interrupted development owing to global economic perturbations. Investment in urban infrastructure since 1980 
began a rapid advance in 1993 with the global economic upturn, peaking in 1998 with a slight decline in the 
following two years due to investment in other projects (Fig. 2). 
 
 
The amount of building activity in Shanghai fueled by government investment expenditures continues to be 
astounding. During the same period following Deng‘s national ―Opening and Reform‖ movement in 1978 
propelling modernization, Shanghai‘s economy shifted from over 77% of gross domestic product in secondary 
sector manufacturing to a more balanced sectoral distribution of 48% in industry and 51% in services in 2000 
and 2001 (Table 2). Employment in manufacturing reached almost 60% in 1990 and has declined steadily since 
to 41% in 2001, while employment in the tertiary sector has grown from 30% in 1990 to more than 47% in 
2001, a remarkable expansion of employment in service activities in step with Shanghai‘s reemergence as a 
commercial city. 
The push for high technology has provided a major impetus for Shanghai‘s economic renaissance. Highlighting 
commodification of high technology ideas in science parks began under the then Mayor Jiang Zemin with 
establishment of Caohejing High Tech Development District in 1991. Fifteen other area science and technology 
parks followed, including three more at the national level (China Science and Technology Department, 2000; 
Ning, 2002). These policies transformed Shanghai from a polluted, aging manufacturing has been on the 
Huangpu to a sparkling new beacon of China‘s modernized future led by showcase Pudong—from farms to 
futuristic French-designed boulevards, the largest metropolitan area park, striking architecture, abundant (and 
expensive) apartments, and a Mecca for middle class and foreign educated workers (Walcott & Xiao, 2000). 
 
A far-reaching change in urban form resulted as industry was extracted from its mix with residential areas in the 
central business (CBD) and commercial (CCD) districts and moved into the middle ring of development (Table 
3). Shanghai‘s extraordinary conversion during the 1990s based on an enormous infusion of financing for 
capital improvements coupled with rapid development of its commercial, manufacturing, and high tech sectors 
led to a remarkable transformation in the city‘s spatial form and associated functional activities. Thus, fast 
economic growth and technology advance are also leading to associated changes in urban morphology and the 
city‘s land use. The most important and noticeable features include (1) the spread of population and increase in 
both manufacturing and services in Pudong, to the east of Shanghai‘s historic core, and (2) in-filling of 
population and economic activity between the core and suburban satellites, particularly along new 
transportation arteries connecting these areas. 
 
 
The commodification of property drove another set of far-reaching spatial as well as economic dynamics. The 
context for spatial development and growth in a rapidly developing major city and metropolitan region such as 
Shanghai must take into account the framework of a transitional economy unfolding in China in recent years in 
which there is a paralleling duality of plan and market (Wu, 1999, 2001). As reforms proceeded in the 1980s 
and a transformed and modified economy emerged under Dengist policies in the early 1990s, new institutional 
players entered the scene and altered the state planning and enterprise mechanisms that had largely determined 
the use of urban land in pre reform China. 
 
First, capital was needed to transform and improve urban infrastructure and building stock. In addition to the 
traditional players of state owned enterprises and planners, new operatives appeared such as foreign investors 
seeking land for industrial and housing investments. They quickly attracted local partners, most of who were 
officially connected to enable them to control the approval process for the transfer of urban land. Local officials 
also saw immediately that capital could be generated through the transfer of urban land use permits, and this 
soon became a widely used mechanism for raising what was perceived by some as unlimited capital for urban 
development (Wu, 1999). 
 
In tracking the increasingly strong forces of commodifying land and housing in Shanghai and other cities in 
China, we must recall the urban reforms initially implemented after the 3rd plenum of the 12th Party Congress 
in 1984 followed by the 1988 policy decision to allow the transfer of property rights for fee payment. These key 
policy decisions were soon followed by other trends such as the drive to accelerate market impulses as 
evidenced in rhetoric Deng used in numerous speeches following his now famous southern tour in 1992. Since 
then the forces of privatization and the particularistic manner in which market and elite party forces have 
intersected to commodify land and land development schemes provide a fascinating example of one form of a 
transitioning socialist urbanism and economy (Wank, 1999; Zhu, 1999). A related version of this was seen in 
the rapid multiplying of special economic and economic development zones seen as special places where local 
and foreign interests would merge and where capital would pour in to develop industrial and housing 
developments in support of China‘s emerging link to the global economy (Walcott, 2002). 
 
Shanghai is an especially interesting example of spatial development as China‘s largest and most important 
industrial and commercial city, and also as a city that largely stagnated during the Maoist period (1949–1976). 
Its modern transformation really did not begin until the Dengist period (1978), and most strikingly not until 
President Jiang Zemin came to power in 1992. The expansion of the city to the east of the Huangpu River and 
the remarkable development of the Pudong zone offers a compelling example of the various political 
mechanisms, players, complexity and character of urban land development and spatial change in the context of 
China‘s rapidly growing transitional economy. What follows will explore some of these channels of 
development and growth that will illustrate the role of the central state and its state owned enterprises, the 
powerful but variable and complex activities of local officials, and the flow of foreign capital and activities 
related to foreign investments. All of the forces intersect to provide the mélange of real conditions that describe 
the evolution of land use and development in contemporary Shanghai. The drive to develop based on the twin 
engines of domestic innovation (Plafker, 1994) and foreign direct investment (FDI) technology transfer 
continues today. 
 
Increasing population and economic activity in areas between established suburbs and major East Asian cities, a 
process known as periurbanization, result from entirely different causes than those driving ―in-filling‖ in 
western metropolitan areas. As powerful central government control that formerly stabilized the economic 
activity of the population devolved during the 1990s, new forms were encouraged to anchor and attract workers 
in peripheral areas. These included township and village enterprises and rural industries popping up in peri-
urban development zones (Webster, 2002). The shift to industrial activity can clearly be seen in Shanghai‘s 
outlying districts as population densities increase in specific districts where major industrial developments are 
in progress. This example of land use change is similar to earlier development patterns in the Pearl River delta 
region (Lin, 2001). 
 
The shift in output value of product as compared in industrial and agricultural goods parallels the spatial shift in 
morphology or land use. In Fig. 3, the growth in the value of industrial output is especially striking in most 
districts of the inner and outer suburbs of Shanghai, and many of these districts also witnessed some increase or 
intensification of agricultural product. Concomitantly the central city, except for the Huangpu District and 
modest industrial gains in Luwan and Chabei, experienced significant declines in the value of agricultural and 
industrial products as the central city shifted its functions increasingly to commercial and service activities with 
different morphological features manifested in the cityscape (Ning & Yan, 1995). Most of the central city has 
indeed become a commercial and service center. 
 
Resuming its function as a thriving Yangtze delta port city from the late 1800s to early 1900s, Shanghai‘s 
campaign to attract particularly high-technology foreign business into new districts on the edges of previously 
developed areas proved remarkably successful. The influx of foreign capital to purchase office and living spaces 
directly impact the cost of facilities in prime real-estate areas, creating foreign communities based on cost 
(Table 4). Jinqiao district contains a major industrial park that includes General Motors as well as many other 
foreign corporate tenants whose top employees also live in the area; Liujiazui constitutes the Wall Street/ 
Manhattan modeled financial district with prices to match; Waigaochiao is the duty free container port with 
large warehousing facilities; Zhangjiang High Tech Park features major foreign manufacturing companies such 
as Motorola, Siemens, and Roche; Xinzhuang reflects more local rates for small and medium foreign and 
domestic manufacturers, particularly from European countries who particularly promote smaller scale 
companies. 
 
 
Shanghai‘s economy, as measured by the percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) in the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors as well as the percentage of the work force employed in each sector, matured 
steadily since the base year of 1978 when ―Opening and Reform‖ began (Table 5). The primary sector (largely 
agriculture) was never large and dropped by 75% from 1978–2001, shifting reliance for food to more peripheral 
areas outside the municipal boundaries. More remarkably, a city known for its manufacturing prowess dropped 
in this same time period from an over 75% share of GDP in the secondary sector to less than half by 2001. The 
tertiary sector, a major focus of investment development in Shanghai and one sorely needed for China‘s 
modernization, soared from less than one-fifth of GDP (and one-fifth of the workforce) in 1978 to around half 
of each measurement by the millennium. 
 
 
Shanghai amply illustrates the relationship between the attraction of advanced foreign firms and growing local 
strength. Vernon‘s (1966) product cycle model illustrating the global location shifts of manufacturing 
originating in an advanced country has its reverse counterpart in Shanghai (Table 6). As China‘s greatest 
industrial and commercial city with the largest percentage of economic activity in the secondary and tertiary 
sector, Shanghai is well on its way through Stage 2, and actively investing in Stage 3 capacity. Both Stage 2 and 
Stage 3 presuppose the existence of a domestic middle and upper class capable of purchasing and inclined to 
support domestic products of sufficient quality, perhaps tailored for the domestic market. This is already the 
case with Legend computers, China‘s best selling brand. The explosion of car ownership in highly congested 
Beijing, based on locally produced models often featuring foreign modifications for the Chinese market such as 
the Volkswagen ―Prius‖, further attests to the maturation of the Chinese urban middle class market. 
 
Finally, we must also acknowledge the benefits accruing to Shanghai from its political links and therefore 
economic and fiscal support as a result of the political ascendancy of its former mayor and then Chinese 
president, Jiang Zemin. Jiang became China‘s highest leader as president in 1992 and assumed increasing 
power as Deng Xiaoping aged and gradually became infirm. Jiang and his inner circle favored Shanghai and 
encouraged its reemergence as the lead city in China‘s growing role as a global economic power in the 1990s. 
In part, it may be speculated, Shanghai‘s rise also served as a counterweight to the rapid surge of the Pearl River 
Delta region and the regional economic power of Hong Kong. China‘s political leaders, it seems, wanted 
Shanghai to reassert its role as the country‘s primate commercial and economic center and a legitimate future 
rival to such great world cities as Tokyo, New York, and London. 
 
Conclusion 
The state‘s deliberate construction of a framework to at least partially allow capitalization of assets in property 
and land use rights to promote China‘s involvement in a global capitalist economic system, within a continuing 
political structure of control promoting rapid development, fits a modified formulation of an urban growth 
regime. Following Yeung and Lin‘s suggestion (2003), theory must necessarily be flexible enough to focus on 
dynamic processes rather than similar outcomes in developing economies with adapting systems integrating 
diverse local contingencies. As China‘s major urban economic engine, Shanghai is in the forefront of changes in 
the metropolitan system, which include: 
 
 economic independence leading to growth in the tertiary sector and property commodification; 
 
 rapid growth of state investment in fixed assets for construction of essential infrastructure; 
 
 in-filling expansion between the urban cores and suburbs; and 
 
 attraction of capital for development by foreign investors. 
 
Shanghai‘s pattern fills a niche in China‘s urban system, which fits its historical role as the Yangtze River delta 
outlet to the outside world and global economy while maintaining a powerful centripetal force in developing 
itself internally. 
 
Continuing patterns set in motion during its decade of economic development takeoff in the 1990s, Shanghai‘s 
urban spatial growth increasingly exhibits a poly nucleated form familiar in the West. Extensions of 
transportation lines funnel settlement along arterial spokes, wheels, and orbiting satellite cities, linked by rail 
and river transportation corridors. Cautionary notes to a too-smooth transition forecast along the lines of more 
developed and earlier developed countries lie in the stark differences of Shanghai‘s size, the remaining top-
down planning proclivities, the continuing strength of politics over economics when the latter is seen to threaten 
the former, and problems with financing development that are too numerous and serious (if necessarily 
somewhat speculative) to detail other than to cite them as a brake on future development. In short, while 
Shanghai seems to be following precedents in urban spatial development patterns set earlier elsewhere, the 
Chinese political economy retains unique ―Chinese characteristics‖, referring to the lingering heavy hand of 
government at various scales. This enduring feature continues to challenge theorists with the empirical reality of 
urbanization in major cities such as Shanghai, whose fate ultimately flows from ―the emperor far away‖. 
 
Thus, a kind of Chinese-modified regime theory appears to be at work in which local, regional, and national 
forces interact to continue to advance Shanghai‘s striking recent growth in ways that are propelling it to 
recapture its former glory and functions. Further enhancing this is China‘s astonishing emergence as a leading 
global manufacturing power and trading actor with Shanghai as its hub and vanguard. This great city, one 
surmises, is using its own form of an urban growth regime, in concert with national and global agents, to 
achieve its future destiny as not only China‘s greatest city but also one of the world‘s leading industrial and 
commercial centers. 
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